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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - TORT IMMUNITY - LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES CAUSED BY NUISANCE MAINTAINED BY CITY-Plaintiff, while in the
bathhouse of a municipally owned and operated swimming pool, was injured by a shock received from an electric hair dryer. In sustaining plaintiff's claim against the city for damages, the trial court recognized liability
for personal injuries caused by a nuisance created and maintained by a city
as an exception to the common law doctrine of municipal immunity from
tort liability. On appeal, held, reversed. The nuisance exception from a
municipality's common law immunity extends only to injuries to real property occasioned by a municipally created and maintained nuisance. City of
Decatur v. Parham, 268 Ala. 585, 109 S. (2d) 692 (1959).
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The common law concept of a municipal corporation's immunity from
tort liability has in most jurisdictions been evaded, narrowed or destroyed
through legislative enactments,1 judicial decisions2 and the development
of the governmental-proprietary function distinction.3 Under the last
theory, the municipality engaged in the performance of an act for the
public benefit, and not for its own proprietary corporate profit, is immune
from liability for injuries inflicted while performing such governmental
activities.4 This "governmental function" immunity, however, has been
further narrowed by the development of the strict "nuisance exception"
under which a city is liable for damages to real property caused by a nuisance
maintained by it, even though in a governmental capacity.'> This narrow
exception, originally concerned with the relationship between a municipality as a land owner and contiguous property owners, had its origin in an
attempt by the courts to reconcile the immunity doctrine with the constitutional prohibition against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.6 The concept then became embodied, in a
number of jurisdictions, in a more broadly stated nuisance doctrine, rationalized in terms of some supposed "principle of universal application-that
every man shall transact his lawful business in such a manner as to do no
unnecessary injury to another." 7 Here the courts found that a municipality
in the use of its land owed the same duties with respect to neighboring property as did private land owners. To avoid extension of this concept to its
logical conclusion of a comparable duty to do "no unnecessary injury" to
the person, a fiction developed that any use of real estate by the municipality which resulted in injury to private property interests was deemed a
l See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 122, §§821-831, codifying the rule of Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, note 2 infra, but limiting school district liability to
$10,000; 11 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1950) §53. But see Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 34,
§301.1 (counties), c. 57½, §3a (forest preserve districts), c. 105, §§333.2a (Chicago Park
District) and 491 (park districts), codifying the common law immunity of those governmental corporations, and apparently precluding operation of the nuisance exception.
2 See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, (Fla. 1957) 96 S. (2d) 130, note, 56 MICH, L.
REv. 465 (1958), restricting municipal immunity to injuries caused in the performance of
judicial, legislative, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions. See especially Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, (III. 1959), 27 U.S. Law Week 2608 (judicially
abrogating common law immunity of school districts). The case was approved and explained on rehearing, (Ill. 1959) 163 N.E. (2d) 189, but without noting passage of the
Illinois statutes cited in note I supra. But see Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer,
(Wyo. 1959) 338 P. (2d) 808, refusing to abrogate the common law immunity by judicial
decision.
3 See, e.g., Krantz v. Hutchinson, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P. (2d) 227 (1948); Hannon v.
Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 136 A. 876 (1927).
4See, e.g., Glenn v. Raleigh, 248 N.C. 378, 103 S.E. (2d) 482 (1958); Houston v.
Shilling, 150 Tex. 387, 240 S.W. (2d) 1010 (1951); Hannon v. Waterbury, note 3 supra;
Mayor and Alderman of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 99 S.E. 307 (1919).
5 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F. (2d) 374 (1925); Mootry v. Danbury,
45 Conn. 550, 29 Am. Rep. 703 (1878); Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 433,
38 Am. Dec. 699 (1845).
6 See, e.g., Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1902).
7 Mootry v. Danbury, note 5 supra, at 556.

600

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

matter within the control and observation of the corporation itself, whereas any personal injury resulting from improper use of this property was
attributable to the negligence of the individual custodian for which the
municipality was not to be liable.a But with the growing dissatisfaction
with the entire concept of municipal immunity, and particularly with the
artificial governmental-proprietary distinction, the nuisance exception was
often extended to encompass personal injuries caused by a municipally
created and maintained nuisance. This extension was usually undertaken
without consideration of the real property relationship upon which the
nuisance exception was based,9 with the result that actions that were actually based on negligence soon came to be classified as nuisance for the
purpose of further narrowing municipal tort immunity.1°
The principal case, while recognizing municipal liability for damage
to real property occasioned by a true nuisance,11 refused to extend the rule
to include injuries to the person. This position, although subscribed to by
relatively few jurisdictions,1 2 was correctly averred to be one consistent with
the basic rationale upon which the nuisance exception was grounded. That
this position is probably the desirable one is shown by the confusion and
inconsistency resulting in jurisdictions which have attempted to make
further inroads on municipal immunity by torturing the law of nuisance.
For example, Michigan, fearful of classifying negligent acts as nuisance, has
permitted recovery for personal injuries only in cases where nuisance per
se has been established,13 while in New Jersey active wrongdoing is the
criterion for assessing personal injury damages occasioned by nuisance.14
In Wisconsin, liability is not imposed if the relationship of governor and
governed exists between the municipality and the injured party.15 Of those
uncommitted jurisdictions which have not yet joined the trend toward
extension of the nuisance exception to include personal injuries, some
already allow nuisance actions against the municipality to recover damages
for injury to real property, and because of their tacit recognition of possible
s See David, "Municipal Liability in Tort in California," 7 So. CAL. L. R:Ev. 214 (1934).
See also 19 R.C.L. 1085 (1917).
9 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (1931); Renstrom v. Nampa,
48 Idaho 130, 279 P. 614 (1929); Knoxville v. Lively, 141 Tenn. 22, 206 S.W. 180 (1918).
But see Mullins Hospital v. Squires, 233 S.C. 186, 104 S.E. (2d) 161 (1958).
10 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Island Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E. (2d) 441 (1952); Warren
v. Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 28 A. (2d) I (1942).
11 Principal case at 590.
12 See, e.g., Vater v. County of Glenn, 49 Cal. 815, 309 P. (2d) 844 (1958); Bojko v.
Minneapolis, 154 Minn. 167, 191 N.W. 399 (1923).
13 Curtis v. Grand Trunk R. Co. of Canada, 178 Mich. 382, 144 N.W. 824 (1914).
14 Casale v. Housing Authority of City of Newark, 42 N.J. Super. 52, 125 A. (2d) 895
(1956).
15 For example, in Champeau v. Village of Little Chute, 275 Wis. 257, 81 N.W. (2d)
562 (1957), the use of a garbage dump as a play area by the injured plaintiffs was completely outside the purpose of the village in maintaining the dump. Since the plaintiffs
were not availing themselves of the intended purpose of the dump, the governor-governed
relationship did not exist and liability was imposed.
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extension of the exception,16 may be expected to include personal injury
within the nuisance exception when the opportunity arises. But the observation of the present confusion in the law of nuisance and negligence
when municipal liability is in question should make any uncommitted
jurisdiction think twice before finding that the policy of indemnifying the
injured party justifies the extension of the nuisance exception to include
personal injuries.
] ames Hourihan

16 See, e.g., Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W. (2d) 485 (1932).

